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Measuring Merit: The Shultz-Zedeck 
Research on Law School Admissions1
Kristen Holmquist, Marjorie Shultz, Sheldon Zedeck 
and David Oppenheimer
Introduction
Law schools profess a commitment to racial diversity both for the 
educational benefits diversity confers and for its contribution to the profession. 
But they admit students based on standards and practices that, while not 
discriminatory in a legal sense, undeniably favor white applicants. In practice, 
the Law School Admissions Test (LSAT) drives admissions decisions more 
than any other factor, despite the fact that it disproportionately disadvantages 
(and excludes) applicants of color. If it is true that racial diversity is crucial 
to quality legal education and to an effective legal profession—and we believe 
it is—then the right thing to do is to consider whether our current admissions 
practices can be changed for the better. This essay describes research that 
explored that question. 
In the late 1990s, the Berkeley law faculty and dean charged a new 
committee with considering the appropriate definition of “merit” in law school 
admissions. The committee concluded that current admission standards were 
inadequate. The LSAT is a narrow test, designed only to predict first-year 
grades, and law school is not simply an academic exercise: it is the gateway to 
becoming a lawyer. In deciding who passes through that portal, law schools, 
the committee determined, should care not just about academic proficiency 
but also about potential professional competence. Despite acknowledging 
important overlap between the skills of attaining high law school grades and 
those of high quality professional performance, the committee determined that 
1. Funding for this research was received from UC Berkeley School of Law and from the Law 
School Admission Council (LSAC). The opinions and conclusions are those of the authors 
and do not necessarily represent the positions or policy of the LSAC. 
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additional elements related to professional performance should be considered 
when selecting students for admission. Commentators had long critiqued the 
LSAT as too narrow, but—during 60 plus years of LSAT use—no persuasive 
additions or alternatives had emerged. Was there a valid way to expand the 
focus?
With this question in mind, two of us (Marjorie Shultz and Sheldon 
Zedeck) undertook an empirical study. The study grew out of the literature 
and methods of personnel psychology and employment selection and its 
goal was to determine whether different, less academic testing could predict 
effective professional performance. We also expected that such tests, unlike 
school-oriented cognitive tests, would reduce or eliminate racial and ethnic 
disparities in law school admission testing. The findings of research on 
employment selection suggest that particular job performance predictors, 
such as personality tests and situational judgment tests, show few race- or 
gender-correlated differences. We hypothesized that just as such tests, adopted 
by courts, have reduced unjustified employment discrimination, broader 
measures of merit predictive of lawyering competence would also yield more 
racially equitable outcomes in law school admissions. 
The research process unearthed a complex model of lawyering. It confirmed 
that professional competence requires not only the analytic quickness and 
precision that law school currently seeks, teaches and rewards but that it also 
requires relational skills, negotiation and planning skills, self-control and self-
development, creativity and practical judgment, among other proficiencies. 
The research confirmed that selection based on this more complete model of 
lawyering greatly reduces racial disparities and captures a more fundamental 
meaning of merit which should drive admission decisions. Finally, and 
importantly, the research showed that professional competence can be 
predicted with objective tests. Just as the LSAT predicts likely academic 
success as a first-year law student, the generally race-neutral assessments that 
Shultz and Zedeck created and tested as a part of this research project predict a 
different sort of merit—likely success as a practicing, problem-solving attorney. 
Part I of this essay engages the ongoing conversation on diversity’s value. 
We began our research as a search for a more compelling account of merit 
that might also produce broader, fairer and less racially disparate bases 
of assessment. This section argues that a substantive commitment to racial 
inclusivity—whether for reasons of equality or because diversity adds value to 
both legal education and the profession—demands that we examine current 
admission practices. Today the question of who belongs in any given law 
school, or in law school at all, turns almost exclusively on the applicant’s 
predicted ability to get good grades as a first-year law student. Law schools, 
almost all claiming to share our commitment to diversity, are not blind to the 
racial harms that accompany this measure of merit. But rather than taking a 
hard look at whether we have adequately or accurately identified the qualities 
students should exhibit when preparing to become a legal professional, 
legal education largely relies on affirmative action to ameliorate the effects 
567
of the LSAT’s racial disparities. That approach is imperfect for a host of 
reasons. Embedded in affirmative action policies is an assumption that most 
minority applicants are not as qualified as admitted white applicants. More 
pragmatically, use of affirmative action in higher education is under attack.2 
Should race-conscious admissions practices be further constricted, every 
law school that values diversity will have to explore race-neutral means of 
achieving it. The Shultz-Zedeck research suggests a theoretically grounded 
and empirically validated approach to that goal.
The research, described in Part II, offers a much more complete and 
complex view of lawyering than is found in legal education’s current model. 
Law school admissions tests were originally pegged to first-year grades on the 
assumption that success during the first year predicted success as a lawyer.3 
But the Shultz-Zedeck research bypasses the use of arguably discriminatory 
proxies like first-year grades4 and asks the direct question: what does lawyering 
success look like and what competencies must one possess to achieve it? Then, 
with a battery of tests, the research predicted not the likelihood of excelling at 
grades, a proxy for lawyering success, but the likelihood of success itself, and 
did so in a race-neutral way. 
The Shultz-Zedeck research provides a new foundation for thinking about 
the purpose of legal education and who deserves a law school seat. Using the 
Shultz-Zedeck approach in addition to the LSAT could expand beyond the 
narrow prediction of law school grades to a more robust set of qualifications 
that seek also to predict professional competence. Such use could also 
introduce race-neutral results to help offset the adverse impact from heavy 
reliance on the LSAT.
A. Racial Inclusion in the Legal Profession
Race-conscious affirmative action was intended to combat discrimination 
and its effects. In recent decades, however, the Supreme Court has limited 
the use of race-conscious admissions practices to measures designed to further 
diversity, rather than those focused on leveling the playing field. Questions 
about what it takes to achieve diversity, what diversity brings to the classroom 
2. Last year’s Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin was just the latest high profile challenge to 
the legal use of race-conscious measures in higher education admissions. The Court’s opinion 
in that case claimed to affirm prior holdings permitting affirmative action, but it emphasized 
the requirement that a university exhaust race-neutral means prior to considering race. It 
is not difficult to imagine the myriad follow-on cases that will challenge the practices of 
individual admissions offices for failing to satisfy this requirement. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at 
Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2420 (2013).
3. See William P. LaPiana, Professor, New York Law School, A History of the Law School 
Admission Council and the LSAT, Keynote Address at the LSAC Annual Meeting (1998). 
4. See William C. Kidder, Does the LSAT Mirror or Magnify Racial and Ethnic Differences in 
Educational Attainment?: A Study of Equally Achieving “Elite” College Students, 89 Cal 
L. Rev. 1055, 1101-1106 (2001) (exploring “evidence suggesting that the environment of legal 
education is contaminated by racial bias, which calls into question the neutrality of using 
law school grades to validate the LSAT”). 
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and the profession beyond dominate public conversations about race and 
legal education today . The notions that racial and ethnic diversity alter the 
learning experience in meaningful ways and are necessary ingredients for an 
effective profession are contested ideas both at the U.S. Supreme Court5 and 
in political discourse. So academia’s willingness to defend diversity’s value is 
important if it is to be achieved. But real commitment to racial inclusion in the 
profession also requires an examination of ongoing and potentially unjustified 
barriers to applicants of color. Why does affirmative action, a problematic and 
legally unstable practice, continue to be necessary? Why is it that without race-
conscious admissions practices the most elite law schools would admit almost 
no black or Latino applicants?6 On a practical level, we know the answer to 
that question. Law schools rely heavily on the LSAT for admissions decisions, 
despite little or no evidence that the LSAT predicts lawyering competence 
and despite the fact that LSAT scores show a marked disparate impact on the 
basis of race. 
Quality, equality and diversity in legal education and the profession would 
be served if law schools would take a hard look at their definition of merit, 
of “who belongs.” Modern discourse about diversity treats it as separable 
from equality. But that superficial approach fails to consider the obvious: race 
must be considered in admissions decisions or otherwise talented students of 
color would be disproportionately excluded because of past—and current—
discrimination. This section both engages the larger discussion about why 
racial inclusion matters and suggests that real commitment to diversity requires 
exploring every legitimate avenue to achieve it, including questioning our own 
habitual but potentially harmful practices. 
Racial inclusion in law school began as a legal and moral claim about 
equality. The argument for inclusion declared that, not only does the 
Constitution prohibit segregation but it is morally repugnant to deny a 
student an education—or to limit its quality—because of race. The first steps 
toward removing those unconstitutional and immoral race-based barriers were 
straightforward (if anything but simple). Courts held that the Constitution’s 
5. In his dissent in the leading case on race-conscious admissions in higher education, Justice 
Antonin Scalia mocked the contribution of educational diversity to citizenship development: 
“This is not, of course, an educational benefit on which students will be graded on their Law 
School transcript (Works and Plays Well with Others: B+) or tested by the bar examiners 
(Q: Describe in 500 words or less your cross-racial understanding). For it is a lesson of life 
rather than law, essentially the same lesson taught to (or rather learned by, for it cannot be 
taught in the usual sense) people three feet shorter and twenty years younger than the full-
grown adults at the University of Michigan Law School, in institutions ranging from Boy 
Scout troops to public-school kindergartens.” Grutter v. Bollinger 539 U.S. 306, 347 (2003).
6. See Linda F. Wightman, The Threat to Diversity in Legal Education: An Empirical Analysis 
of the Consequences of Abandoning Race as a Factor in Law School Admissions Decisions, 
72 NYU L. Rev. 1, 18-29 (1997); Brief of the Law School Admission Council as Amicus 
Curiae in Support of Respondents, at 2. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411 
(2013) (“The simple, demonstrable statistical fact is that most selective law schools in this 
country will have almost no students of certain races unless they adopt admissions policies 
designed to alter that outcome.”).
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equal protection clause prohibited law schools, like all other schools, from 
excluding applicants because of their race. But the legacy of segregation 
and inequality runs deep—impacting the relative quality of neighborhood 
schools, the financial means of entire communities and families within them, 
the decision-making of school officials who may well have thought themselves 
colorblind but who continued to mentor, teach, admit and evaluate students 
differently depending on the students’ race. And this legacy continued (and 
continues) to leave students of color, on average, differently situated with 
respect to educational markers than most white students. Removing explicit 
barriers was not enough to undo the effects of centuries of slavery, segregation 
and other forms of legal and extralegal discrimination.7 In response to this 
reality, law schools (along with other institutions of higher education) took 
affirmative steps to eliminate the vestiges of segregation “root and branch8” 
and admit students of color through an admissions process that considered 
not only numeric academic indications of potential but also the race of the 
applicant. 
Courts quickly lost patience with race-consciousness as a remedy for 
systemic discrimination. Whether this shift stemmed from an honest belief that 
race-based remedies were no longer necessary (or compromised core values), 
or was simply a new expression of hostility toward discrimination claims and 
prioritization of white viewpoints, the effect was the same. Universities (and 
law schools) that hoped to maintain their admissions criteria and educate a 
racially diverse class of students had to justify affirmative action in a way less 
likely to trigger Supreme Court skepticism. The emphasis moved away from 
the moral struggle for equality and toward the value that diversity brought.9 
Racial and ethnic diversity adds value in the classroom: law students receive 
a superior education when they experience it in a diverse environment. And 
racial and ethnic diversity adds value to the profession: lawyers serve entirely 
too central and important a role in our political structures, in our economy,10 
7. Research on “stereotype threat,” for example, suggests that marginalized groups may 
experience depressed performance on high stakes testing as a result of pressure and anxiety 
associated with that marginalization. See, e.g., Claude M. Steele, A Threat in the Air: How 
Stereotypes Shape Intellectual Identity and Performance, 52 Am. Psychol. 613 (1997); Claude 
M. Steele & Joshua Aronson, Stereotype Threat and the Intellectual Test Performance of 
African Americans, 69 J. of Personality and Social Psychol. 797, 799-801 (1995).
8. Green v. County School Board of New Kent County, 391 U.S. 430, 438 (1968).
9. Derrick Bell noted that the question of adding value is almost always about adding value to 
white people’s experience and goals. See Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education 
and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 518 (1980) [hereinafter Board of 
Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma]; Derrick Bell, Diversity’s Distractions, 
103 Colum. L. Rev. 1622 (2003) [hereinafter Diversity’s Distractions].
10. For a version of this argument focused on large corporate law firms and their desire for 
diversity, see David B. Wilkins, From “Separate Is Inherently Unequal” to “Diversity is 
Good for Business”: The Rise of Market-Based Diversity Arguments and the Fate of the 
Black Corporate Bar, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 1548 (2004).
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in institutions both legal and otherwise to be drawn overwhelmingly from a 
single (white) subgroup of the population.11 
Given the high court’s skepticism of affirmative action’s ability to remedy 
“societal discrimination” (whether past or present) without imposing greater 
harm, law schools were right to embrace these value-added arguments. 
Diversity does and should change both the educational experience and the 
quality of the legal profession. A recent study on the effect of racial diversity 
on the law school experience confirms the intuition of affirmative action’s 
proponents: “race/ethnicity [is] a significant factor associated with differences 
of sociopolitical attitudes, experiences, discrimination histories, behaviors 
during law school and professional aspirations.”12 And those differences 
change the conversation, and thus the learning experience, in the classroom.
The race-correlated differences that the study’s authors detailed not only 
have an impact on a lawyer’s schooling, they arguably also alter the legal 
profession itself and its relationship with the larger society. Consider just 
two of the survey categories: “experiences of discrimination and coping” and 
“pursuit of social justice.”13 Each of these categories included a variety of 
questions, with the answers broken down on two separate axes: gender (male 
and female) and race (white and black). Sixty-three percent of black men and 
thirty-one percent of black women answered that they had at some point been 
stopped unfairly by police.14 Twenty-five percent of white men and ten percent 
of white women said the same.15 Thirty-three percent of black men and thirty-
five percent of black women reported that they had been unfairly discouraged 
from continuing their educations, while only five percent of white men and 
thirteen percent of white women reported being similarly discouraged.16 On 
the question of social justice/individual rights attitudes, twice as many white 
students as black students believed that “in America today, every person has 
an equal opportunity to achieve economic success.”17
11. This was the thrust of the Court’s opinion in Grutter. That not only is racial diversity 
beneficial to legal education but a diverse legal profession is essential to a well-functioning 
military, to business organizations, and to society as a whole. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 
306, 330-31 (2003).
12. Charles E. Daye, A.T. Panter, Walter R. Allen & Linda F. Wightman, Does Race Matter 
in Educational Diversity? A Legal Empirical Analysis, Rutgers Race & the Law Review 
Symposium 76-S, 188-S (2012).
13. The survey categories included: Race Relations and Racial Issues; Discrimination against 
Societal Groups; Pursuit of Social Justice; Individual Rights; Personal Background 
Factors; Diversity of Family Background; Experiences of Discrimination and Coping; 
Undergraduate Academic Experiences; and Personal Diversity Beliefs. See id. 
14. Id. at 123-S.
15. Id.
16. Id. 
17. Id. at 112-S.
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These beliefs and experiences (along with many others) cannot help 
but inform a lawyer’s day-to-day work. A prosecutor who has experienced 
harassment by the police may well bring a different sense of skepticism to her 
cases. A corporate lawyer who believes that it takes more than just hard work 
and skill to achieve economic success may be more likely to perform pro bono 
work that provides opportunities for communities where economic success is 
not so easily come by. Lawyers give meaning to concepts like “rights,” “fair,” 
“reasonable” and “justice.” They arbitrate disputes among conflicting groups 
and entrenched interests. They work to further individual, corporate and 
community goals. In all of these tasks, it matters what a lawyer understands 
about the world, what she believes to be possible. To the extent the experiences 
and attitudes that act together to create a world view are correlated with race, 
racial diversity changes and improves the profession and allows it to serve an 
incredibly diverse and interconnected society’s interests.
But law schools’ current admissions practices hinder the creation of a 
racially inclusive legal profession (even when other alternative approaches 
are emerging18). And the Supreme Court’s psychic shift from remedying 
discrimination to the value of diversity has allowed educators like us to take 
our eyes off questions of equity. We stopped asking ourselves whether our own 
methods were fair and appropriate, despite ample evidence that our narrow 
focus on the LSAT favors white students.
In the quest to find law school applicants who are likely to excel as first-
year students,19 admissions offices focus on a combination of undergraduate 
grades and LSAT scores. Schools vary in how they weight the LSAT relative 
to the undergraduate grade-point average, but almost every school weighs 
the LSAT much more heavily.20 And while personal statements, resumes and 
letters of recommendation (the stuff of holistic review) matter at the margins, 
the lion’s share of almost every law school class is admitted based primarily 
on the strength of individual applicants’ combined undergraduate grades and 
LSAT, or index scores.21 Taken together, these facts mean that most law school 
applicants are admitted or rejected from any given school based heavily on 
18. See, e.g., Kimberly West-Faulcon, More Intelligent Design: Testing Measures of Merit, 13 U. 
Pa. J. Const. L. 1235 (2011).
19. The LSAT has limited ambitions. According to LSAC, it is designed to predict first-year 
grades and nothing more. It tests “the reading and comprehension of complex tests with 
accuracy and insight; the organization and management of information and the ability 
to draw reasonable inferences from it; the ability to think critically; and the analysis and 
evaluation of the reasoning and arguments of others.” About the LSAT, LSAC, available at 
http://www.lsac.org/jd/lsat/about-the-lsat.asp.
20. See Kidder, supra note 4, at 1103. 
21. See Phoebe A. Haddon & Deborah W. Post, Misuse and Abuse of the LSAT: Making the 
Case for Alternative Evaluative Efforts and Redefinition of Merit, 80 St. John’s L. Rev. 41, 
62-64 (2006); See also Linda F. Wightman, The Consequences of Race Blindness: Revisiting 
Prediction Models with Current Law School Data, 53 J. Legal Educ. 229, 235 (2003); William 
C. Kidder, The Rise of the Testocracy: An Essay on the LSAT, Conventional Wisdom, and 
the Dismantling of Diversity, 9 Tex. J. Women & L. 167 (2000).
Measuring Merit
572	 Journal of Legal Education
their LSAT scores. In fact, differences of just a few points can affect whether 
a student will be admitted or rejected—despite the fact that the LSAC (which 
creates and administers the test) itself advises against relying on fine-grain 
score distinctions in that way.22 
Academics familiar with the unequal race distribution of LSAT scores seem 
to be uncomfortable with—but resigned to—heavy reliance on the test, believing 
it is the best measure we have. But it is not at all obvious that the LSAT is our 
best available method for determining who will, and who will not,23 become 
lawyers. In fact, the authors of a longitudinal study of three generations of 
students of color admitted to University of Michigan Law School noted that 
“LSAT scores and UGPA scores . . . seem to have no relationship to success 
after law school, whether success is measured by earned income, career 
satisfaction or service contributions.”24 Nonetheless, law schools—professional 
schools—rely more heavily25 on academic factors in making decisions than do 
most graduate departments that train people primarily for academic careers. 
Law schools also place greater weight on academic test scores than do other 
professional schools such as medicine or business. 
The racial harm from this heavy LSAT reliance is difficult to overstate. 
Research consistently shows that, on average, white students perform better 
on standardized tests, including the LSAT, than black or Latino applicants.26 
22. See infra note 25. 
23. White law school applicants have much higher odds of acceptance to law school than do 
black or Latino applicants. See Tamar Lewin, Law School Admissions Lag Among Minorities, 
N.Y. Times, Jan. 6, 2010, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/07/education/07law.
html?_r=0 (“[F]rom 2003 to 2008, 61 percent of black applicants and 46 percent of Mexican-
American applicants were denied acceptance at all of the law schools to which they applied, 
compared with 34 percent of white applicants.”).
24. David L. Chambers, Richard O. Lempert & Terry K. Adams, Michigan’s Minority 
Graduates in Practice: The River Runs through Law School, 25 Law & Soc. Inquiry 395, 401 
(2000).
25. To temper this overreliance on LSAT scores, the LSAC promulgated a set of cautionary 
policies. See Cautionary Policies Concerning LSAT Scores and Related Services, LSAC 
(2005), available at http://www.lsac.org/lsacresources/publications/pdfs/cautionarypolicies.
pdf (warning against giving the test “undue weight . . . solely because its use is convenient,” 
as well as against “plac[ing] excessive significance on score differences.”). LSAC began 
banding to “represent a range of scores that has a certain probability of containing the test 
taker’s actual proficiency level. The score bands reported for the LSAT are designed to 
include the test taker’s actual proficiency level in approximately 68 percent of cases. In other 
words, there is a 68 percent level of confidence that the test taker’s true score actually falls 
within the band.” A score of 160, for example, usually results in a score band of something 
like 157-163. What is a Score Band?, U. of Dayton (1997), available at http://academic.udayton.
edu/thewhitestlawschools/2005twls/chapter2/scorebands.pdf. Despite these cautions and 
practices, in recent decades score differences on the LSAT have become more, not less, 
important to law school admissions. See, e.g., Haddon & Post, supra, note 21. 
26. See, e.g., Frank L. Schmidt & John E. Hunter, Employment Testing: Old Theories and 
New Research Findings, Am. Psychologist, 36, 1128-37 (1981) [hereinafter Employment 
Testing]  (recognizing average differences on cognitive tests across racial groups and testing 
explanatory theories); Wightman, Threat to Diversity, supra note 6, at 18-20 (providing an 
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The mean LSAT score among white test takers in the 2008-2009 testing year 
was about 152. The mean score among black test takers was 142, and among 
Latinos it was 146.27 To get a feel for what these differences represent, consider 
the LSAT score spread at a few representative law schools. At Columbia Law 
School, for example, the 25th percentile LSAT score was 171 for the entering 
class of 2011. The 75th percentile score for that class was 175. Further down in 
the top tier28, the 25th percentile LSAT score at Fordham was 163. Fordham’s 
75th percentile score was 167. In other words, 50 percent of Fordham’s entering 
class had an LSAT score that fell in the narrow band of 163-167. Fifty percent 
of Columbia’s fell into the band between 171 and 175. At another New York 
school, Albany Law School,29 the band stretched from 151-157. Relatively small, 
arguably meaningless, differences in LSAT scores thus are likely to make a 
huge difference in the admissions process. 
At most law schools, the negative impacts of the LSAT have been at least 
partly ameliorated through an admissions process that occasionally looks 
at a variety of factors other than test scores and grades, including race.30 If 
a school does care about admitting a diverse class, then this holistic, race-
conscious review is a necessary caveat to LSAT-driven acceptances. The LSAC 
itself recently asserted that the “inescapable lesson of the statistical evidence 
compiled year after year by LSAC is that, unless America’s law schools are 
allowed to adopt race-conscious admissions policies, many of the nation’s 
lawyers will be trained in an environment of racial homogeneity.”31
The race-conscious measures that most schools use to combat the problems 
with the LSAT and admit a more diverse class than they otherwise would are 
helpful but imperfect. Law school classes are without question more diverse 
today than they were 50 years ago, but they still show the effects of historical 
discrimination as well as our acceptance of a functional definition of merit that 
has significant adverse impact. In 2010, just 4.8 percent of lawyers were black 
example of average LSAT score differences across races and ethnicities).
27. Susan P. Dalessandro, Lisa A. Stilwell, Jennifer A. Lawlor & Lynda M. Reese, LSAT 
Performance with Regional, Gender, and Racial/Ethnic Breakdowns: 2005-2006 Through 
2011-2012 Testing Years, LSAT Technical Reports 19 (2012), available at http://www.lsac.org/
lsacresources/research/tr/pdf/tr-12-03.pdf. 
28. Colloquially, the “top tier” has come to mean the top 50 schools. All of these numbers 
are available through the U.S. News & World Report ranking website, available at http://
grad-schools.usnews.rankingsandreviews.com/best-graduate-schools/top-law-schools/law-
rankings. For a discussion of the power of and problems with this ranking system, see Laura 
Rothstein, The LSAT, U.S. News & World Report, and Minority Admissions:, Special 
Challenges and Special Opportunities for Law School Deans, 80 St. John’s L. Rev. 257 
(2006). 
29. Albany Law School is considered a “third tier” law school.
30. Brief of the Law School Admission Council as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents, 
Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013), supra note 6, at 2 (noting that most 
law schools make explicit use of race in admissions process to ensure racially diverse class). 
31. Id. 
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and 3.7 percent Latino. In the 2012-2013 school year, out of 44,481 entering law 
students, 3,816 were black32 and 4,040 Latino (about 8.5 percent and 9 percent, 
respectively).33 Meanwhile, African Americans represent 12.6 percent of the 
American population, while about 16 percent of the population is Latino.34 
Affirmative action has plenty of substantive critics. Scholars on both the 
left and right have argued that race-conscious admissions processes are too 
opaque, poorly tailored and insufficient to achieve anything like true equality 
of educational access.35 And external forces—state ballot measures that ban race-
conscious measures and legal challenges questioning their constitutionality—
regularly threaten to further unravel the already tenuous fabric of affirmative 
action. On its face, the Supreme Court’s decision last term in Fisher v. University 
of Texas36 upheld Grutter and maintained the affirmative action status quo. But 
its language placed renewed emphasis on exhausting race-neutral means 
before resorting to race-conscious measures. Depending on how admissions 
officers and lower courts interpret that exhortation, race may no longer be 
considered in many, if not most, admissions decisions. Should that happen, 
32. Elizabeth Chambliss suggests that this low number may be, in part, self-perpetuating. 
“The low level of black representation in the profession may discourage promising black 
students from considering law and limit black lawyers’ chances to find mentors and role 
models within the law.” “More Men Black Lawyers, But Racial Gap Remains” Diversity 
Inc. (quoting Chambliss discussing the findings of Miles to Go: Progress of Minorities 
in the Legal Profession, ABA Commission on Racial and Ethnic Diversity in the Legal 
Profession (2005)), available at http://www.diversityinc.com/diversity-recruitment/
more-black-men-lawyers-but-racial-gap-remains/.
33. The American Bar Association’s data on the demographics of the profession can
be found at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/marketresearch/
PublicDocuments/lawyer_demographics_2011.authcheckdam.pdf. The ABA’s law school 
enrollment numbers can be found at http://www.americanbar.org/groups/legal_education/
resources/statistics.html.
34. 2010 Census Data, U.S. Census Bureau, available at http://www.census.gov/2010census/
data/.
35. For very different arguments about the problems with affirmative action in higher education 
compare Bell, Diversity’s Distractions, supra note 9 (suggesting that race-conscious 
admissions, as currently practiced, are less about providing opportunity for students of color 
and more about providing cover for institutions that want to continue relying on entrenched 
admissions practices that benefit the white elite), with Richard Sander, A Systemic Analysis 
of Affirmative Action in American Law Schools, 57 Stan. L. Rev. 367 (2004) (suggesting 
that affirmative action creates a mismatch effect that leads black law students to struggle 
academically and actually depresses the number of black attorneys); but see Ian Ayres & 
Richard R. W. Brooks, Does Affirmative Action Reduce the Number of Black Lawyers?, 
57 Stan. L. Rev. 1807 (2005) (showing that affirmative action increases the number of black 
attorneys); Daniel E. Ho, Affirmative Action’s Affirmative Action: A Reply to Sander, 114 
Yale L.J. 2011 (2005) (taking issue with Sander’s methodology); and David B. Wilkins, A 
Systemic Response to Systemic Disadvantage, 57 Stan. L. Rev. 1915 (2005) (arguing that 
black lawyers gain benefits from prestigious degrees that may outweigh the value of law 
school grades). 
36. 631 F.3d 213 (5th Cir. 2011) cert. granted, 132 S.Ct. 1536 (2012).
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legal education’s traditional method of diversifying its classes, especially at the 
most elite levels, may disappear.37 
California provides an important post-affirmative action test case. We know 
from that state’s experience, where race-based affirmative action is banned, 
that if law schools no longer can use race as a diversity factor in admissions, 
the number of black and Latino students they enroll will drop dramatically. 
According to a recent look at the data at the most elite California law schools, 
despite a large increase in the number and the test scores of African Americans 
applying to American law schools, African American enrollments at Berkeley 
Law and UCLA Law have decreased since the passage of Proposition 209 
(which banned use of race in public education and contracting) on average 
by half or more.38 In a post-affirmative-action world, schools committed to 
diversity may have to find another way to achieve it. 
Attacks on race-conscious admission measures may require law schools to 
do what should have been done long ago: move beyond arguments about 
how to achieve diversity, given current admissions standards, and question 
the standards themselves. To maintain an equitable admissions system and 
continue to contribute to a racially diverse legal profession, law schools may 
have to redefine qualification and merit in ways that are less racially harmful.39 
The Shultz-Zedeck research points toward an alternative—tests that may help 
legal educators assess law school applicants in a way that is both race-neutral 
and more keyed to effective lawyering. 
II. Shultz-Zedeck Research Findings—Redefining Merit
The end of affirmative action in California prompted Shultz and Zedeck 
to re-think the meaning of merit in law school admissions. Once they decided 
that professional promise should be included in admission calculations, it 
became essential to investigate whether additional or alternative approaches 
to assessing applicants could be fruitfully used. They did not want to discard 
the LSAT/UGPA as a tool. In fact from the beginning they assumed that law 
schools would continue to rely on those numbers, perhaps as a first hurdle in 
the admissions process. But they wanted to know whether it was possible to 
37. While Fisher itself presented a constitutional challenge and thus immediately impacts only 
public universities, Title VI prohibits discrimination at any university that accepts federal 
funds and every university accepts federal funds. The discrimination that Title VI prohibits 
is prohibited by the equal protection clause. In other words, as go public schools, so private 
schools will per force follow. 
38. See William C. Kidder, Misshaping the River: Proposition 209 and Lessons for the Fisher 
Case, 39 J.C. & U.L 53, 54-55 (2013). Some of this drop was because fewer black students 
were accepted; and some of it can be attributed to a yield question: fewer black students who 
were admitted wanted to attend UC schools after Proposition 209.
39. For a theoretical discussion on the relationship between measures of merit and bias, see 
Daria Roithmayer, Deconstructing the Distinction Between Bias and Merit, 85 Cal. L. Rev. 
1449 (1998) (arguing that “merit standards disproportionately exclude white women and 
people of color because merit standards were developed by dominant social groups in ways 
that have disproportionately benefited their descendants”).
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predict more directly which applicants promised to be effective lawyers. Based 
on the success of related research in Zedeck’s field of personnel psychology, 
they believed that lawyering performance might be predictable and that 
particular non-cognitive job-performance-based measures were unlikely to 
reproduce the same racial disparities that arise from LSAT scores. 
A. Background
Personnel—or industrial—psychology has a long history of helping 
organizations create and implement hiring (or selection) procedures that both 
predict relevant job skills and avoid racially disparate results.40 As a discipline, 
personnel psychology studies job analysis, definitions and measurements 
of job performance, performance appraisals and employee hiring and 
training. Because of this expertise, the EEOC has long relied on personnel 
psychologists to help flesh out regulations for the antidiscrimination mandate 
of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. Title VII prohibits employers from using 
a hiring test with disparate racial results unless that test is sufficiently job 
related.41 And in fields where many pencil-and-paper cognitive tests proved 
both racially discriminatory and insufficiently related to relevant work tasks, 
personnel psychologists stepped in to help create better tests and strategies 
for using test results.42 These tests—in fields as varied as firefighting and 
medicine—begin with a rigorous job analysis. What are the constituent tasks 
and skills of this job? What competencies are required to be effective at it? 
From these analyses, psychologists create situational judgment, biographical 
and personality assessments that reveal aptitudes, tendencies and behaviors 
that correlate with the essential skills and competencies required for success 
in the job. The literature shows that these types of tests not only are helpful in 
selecting effective employees, but that they produce far less disparity among 
racial subgroups than more traditional cognitive tests.43
40. Frank L. Schmidt & John E. Hunter, The validity and utility of selection methods in 
personnel psychology: Practical and theoretical implications of 85 years of research 
findings, 124 Psychological Bulletin, 262 (Sept. 1998); Ann Marie Ryan & Nancy T. Tippins, 
Attracting and Selecting: What Psychological Research Tells Us, 43 Hum. Resource Mgmt. 
305 (2004).
41. The standards for determining whether a test is fair and nondiscriminatory are found in the 
Uniform Guidelines for Employee Selection Procedures [hereinafter UGESP], 29 C.F.R. 
§ 1607 (1978). The UGESP were adopted in 1978 by the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission, Civil Service Commission, Department of Labor, and the Department of 
Justice.
42. See, e.g., Wayne F. Cascio, James Outtz, Sheldon Zedeck & Irwin L. Goldstein, Statistical 
Implications of Six Methods of Test Score Use in Personnel Selection, 4 Hum. Performance 
233 (1991); David Chan & Neal Schmitt, Situational Judgment and Job Performance, 15 
Hum. Performance 233 (2002); Robert Hogan, Joyce Hogan & Brent W. Roberts, Personality 
Measurement and Employment Decisions: Questions and Answers, 51 Am. Psychol. 469 
(1996).
43. See Leaetta M. Hough, Frederick L. Oswald & Robert E. Ployhart, Determinants, Detection, 
and Amelioration of Adverse Impact in Personnel Selection Procedures: Issues, Evidence, 
and Lessons Learned, 9 Int’l J. of Selection and Assessment 152 (2001).
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Personnel psychology principles regarding selection and discrimination in 
employment should also help guide the law school admissions process. Law 
schools not only choose law students but they are the de facto gate-keepers to 
the legal profession. Admission to law school is the narrowest point in the path 
to the legal profession, making law school admission not only an academic 
hurdle but a professional one.
B. The Research
In 1998, informed by this employment law and employment practices 
background, Shultz and Zedeck began a long-term research project to look 
for methods that, combined with the index score, would allow law schools 
to do a better job of admitting prospective lawyers with strengths in a variety 
of relevant lawyering capacities. The research produced a set of core, general 
skills and competencies for lawyering as well as tests capable of predicting 
competency levels for most, if not all, of them. The scores on those tests did 
not appear to be correlated with race. In other words, high scores—scores that 
predicted strength in a given lawyering competency—were fairly evenly spread 
among races and ethnicities for each of the lawyering competencies (called 
“effectiveness factors”). The theoretical and methodological foundations of 
the Shultz-Zedeck research, as well the study’s methodology and detailed 
findings, are available at length in a report published in Law & Social Inquiry.44 
We will give a brief summary here.
The first task in the research was to define successful or effective lawyering. 
Rather than relying on traditional measures of success—bar passage, salary 
or time passed before achieving partner status—the researchers decided to 
follow the path laid out in personnel psychology and ask more fundamental 
questions. What does it mean to lawyer? What are lawyering’s constituent 
competencies? To answer this, they conducted hundreds of interviews with 
lawyers, law faculty, law students, judges and clients and asked questions like, 
“If you were looking for a lawyer for an important matter for yourself, who 
would you identify and why? What qualities and behavior would cause you to 
choose that attorney? What kind of lawyer would you want to teach or be?” 
In the course of these conversations, consensus coalesced around 26 factors of 
lawyering effectiveness. Some of those factors were unsurprising and, indeed, 
the very skills at the core of legal education: analysis and reasoning, influencing 
and advocating, and writing. But others were perhaps more surprising and not 
likely to be measured by the LSAT or first-year grades. Some of these included 
problem solving, practical judgment, listening, organizing and managing one’s 
own work, building and developing relationships (with clients, with other 
attorneys) and the ability to see the world through the eyes of others.45 Some of 
44. Marjorie M. Shultz & Sheldon Zedeck, Predicting Lawyer Effectiveness: Broadening the 
Basis for Law School Admission Decisions, 36 Law & Soc. Inquiry 620 (2011).
45. The complete list of Effectiveness Factors is: analysis and reasoning; creativity/innovation; 
problem solving; practical judgment: researching the law; fact finding; questioning 
and interviewing; influencing and advocating; writing; speaking; listening; strategic 
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the 26 factors are especially relevant to lawyering within particular institutions 
or contexts, but many extend across categories (although particular forms of 
their expression may vary) and are core to most lawyers’ day-to-day work. 
The next step was to define the lawyering competencies and determine 
what excellent (and less than excellent) performance in each would look like. 
The research team did this by developing a pool of behavioral examples for 
each of the 26 effectiveness factors. The researchers asked focus groups of 
lawyers, “What behavior would tell you a lawyer had or lacked effectiveness in 
‘listening’?” for example. This process resulted in more than 800 descriptions 
that represented poor, below average, average, good and outstanding behaviors 
across the 26 factors. Next, more than 2,000 Berkeley Law alumni evaluated 
each example on a scale from 1 to 5 for its level of effectiveness. These data—the 
behavioral examples for each of the 26 factors and the effectiveness ranking for 
each example—allowed Shultz and Zedeck to create a set of lawyer performance 
measurement scales. The researchers then adapted the scales to an assessment 
instrument that would allow rating a lawyer’s professional performance in 
a systematic, structured and standardized manner. The instrument allows a 
performance appraiser to ask questions like: “Are my employee’s analysis and 
reasoning behaviors more like a 2 or a 4 on the rating scales?” Or: “When my 
employee engages in problem solving, does her process more closely resemble 
the examples rated a 3 or those rated a 5?”
This definitional and description phase set up the ultimate research 
question: can tests predict propensities in these 26 lawyering competencies 
like the LSAT predicts first-year grades? Is it possible to provide law school 
admissions offices with evidence that an applicant is likely to be a good lawyer 
as well as a good first-year student? Shultz and Zedeck looked for tests that 
might predict actual performance on these lawyering factors. In the end, 
they selected five existing tests and wrote or adapted three other tests. The 
tests included measures of situational judgment, personality, organizational 
fit, expectations and self-expression monitoring. One asked for and assessed 
relevant biographical information. 
Because the situational judgment tests and the requests for biographical 
data produced especially robust data, it is worth explaining a bit about these 
assessment measures. Situational judgment tests measure an individual’s 
judgment about and reaction to various difficult scenarios. In personnel 
psychology, these measures have proven important predictors of work 
performance. The tests pose hypothetical situations and ask a test-taker 
what her likely response would be. For example, one question, determined 
planning; organizing and managing one’s own work; organizing and managing others 
(staff/colleagues); negotiation skills; ability to see the world through the eyes of others; 
networking and business development; providing advice & counsel & building relationships 
with clients; developing relationships within the legal profession; evaluation, development, 
and mentoring; passion and engagement; diligence; integrity/honesty; stress management; 
community involvement and service; and self-development. 
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to reflect competency in three areas (influencing and advocating, developing 
relationships, and integrity) asks:
You learn that a co-worker, Angela, whom you helped train for the job, 
copied some confidential and proprietary information from the company’s 
files. What would you do?
a. Tell Angela what I learned and that she should destroy the 
information before she gets caught.
b. Anonymously report Angela to management.
c. Report Angela to management and after disciplinary action has 
been taken, tell Angela that I’m the one that did so.
d. Threaten to report Angela unless she destroys the information.
e. Do nothing.
Research in personnel psychology also suggests that eliciting targeted 
information about an applicant’s history can predict work-related skills and 
competencies. These biographical data assessments ask a factual question 
about the test taker’s life, such as, “How many times in the past year were you 
able to think of a way of doing something that most others would not have 
thought of?” and provide three or four potential answers (along the lines of 
“one to three times,” “five to ten times,” etc.) to pick among.46
Finally, 15,750 people (then-current Berkeley Law students and alumni of 
Hastings College of the Law and Berkeley Law who graduated between 1973 
and 2006) were invited to participate in the research. More than 1,100 did so. 
Each participant took a battery of tests (including the situational judgment 
test, the biographical data test and a variety of personality evaluations). Each 
participant also identified four people (two current peers and two current 
superiors), who could assess his/her job performance by using a subset of the 
effectiveness factors previously described that related to his/her practice and 
situation.47 The research hypothesis was that results on some or all of those 
tests would correlate with the test taker’s rated competencies in a relevant 
subset of the 26 effectiveness factors—and thus be predictors of professional 
competence.
The results of this phase showed real potential to create admissions tests 
capable of predicting lawyering performance. In other words, participants’ 
test results did correlate with lawyering skill. Each participant took an hour-
long test made up of about 30 questions drawn randomly from the situational 
judgment and biographical tests, which also included personality tests that 
Shultz and Zedeck selected at the outset. Not every question was useful. In fact 
46. For more details on these tests and the validation methodologies, see Shultz & Zedeck, 
Predicting Lawyer Effecitveness, supra note 44.
47. In addition to engaging in the effectiveness assessments and taking the tests, each 
participant provided basic biographical data including gender, age, ethnicity, law school 
and employment information. With the permission of participants, Shultz and Zedeck 
obtained LSAT and law school performance data either from the LSAC or from the law 
schools for additional analysis.
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a couple of the personality tests were rejected as not terribly helpful. But one of 
the personality tests48 and many of the situational judgment and biographical 
data questions49 yielded important and interesting results. Participants’ 
aggregate answers to those questions correlated to their lawyering abilities. 
In other words, lawyers who had been evaluated as superior communicators 
on the Shultz-Zedeck scales consistently chose answer A on question x, C on 
question y, and B on question z. Poor networkers created similar patterns on 
questions e, f, and g. In the end, answers to the valid questions on these new tests 
predicted participants’ competency levels for almost all 26 of the effectiveness 
factors. The LSAT and UGPA were not particularly useful for predicting 
lawyer performance on the large majority of the 26 effectiveness factors. In 
fact, the LSAT correlated with 12 of the factors, with four of those correlations 
positive and eight negative (e.g., networking/business development and 
community service).50 The new tests, however, predicted almost all 26 
competencies. Moreover, the new tests’ correlations were generally higher, 
though moderately so, with even the small subset of the most academically 
associated competencies (analysis and reasoning, researching the law, writing) 
than the LSAT’s correlation with those same factors. And consistent with what 
personnel psychology has generally found, neither the actual assessments of 
the lawyers’ job performance (based on the effectiveness factor ranking scales), 
nor their scores on the battery of tests that predicted professional competence, 
showed correlations to race that were practically significant. While the LSAT 
favors white applicants, these new tests show promise to place applicants on a 
level playing field, regardless of race. 
C. Next Steps and a Research Agenda
The transformation of this initial research into a workable admissions test 
would come with further research. The first phase of the study looked only at 
lawyers who graduated from Berkeley Law and Hastings College of the Law. 
A next phase would begin earlier in career development (applicants rather 
than lawyers) and include people who will land at a much broader range of 
schools. Ideally, a longitudinal validation study would give a version of a new 
test—consisting of a mix of the best situational judgment, biographical data 
and personality assessment questions—to law school applicants. Researchers 
would then track test takers through the application process, through law 
school (or lack thereof, should some test takers decide not to go to law school 
48. This test was the Hogan Personality Inventory (HPI). For more information on the HPI see 
Robert Hogan, Joyce Hogan & Rodney Warrenfeltz, The Hogan Guide: Interpretation and 
Use of Hogan Inventories (Hogan Assessment Systems 2007). 
49. The research team drafted the situational judgment (SJT) questions and the biographical 
data (BIO) questions themselves. In doing so, they relied on the personnel psychology 
principles described above. Some of the SJT and BIO questions were thrown out as invalid, 
but many proved scientifically valid. Our claims of correlation are based on those validated 
questions. Future tests would have to go through similar validation processes. 
50. The results of positive and negative vary depending on the performance measure. For more 
information, see Shultz & Zedeck, Predicting Lawyer Effectiveness, supra note 44. 
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or not be admitted), and into the beginning stages of their careers (and perhaps 
beyond). Throughout, researchers would examine whether the test takers’ 
predicted lawyering abilities (represented by their scores on the Shultz-Zedeck 
tests) correlated with appraisals of their lawyering skills. In other words, could 
we replicate the correlations we found in the initial study?
That same research process would consider the question of coachability. A 
typical response of someone who hears about this research for the first time 
begins with, “Wow, that’s amazing! Is it for real?” A longitudinal study that 
captures a broad range of applicants/students/lawyers51 would confirm the 
answer to that first question. The second set of questions sound something 
like, “But what happens when Kaplan and Princeton Review create Shultz-
Zedeck prep courses—is this test coachable? Will that create the same racial 
disparities all over again?” And those are fair and important questions.
The testing literature defines coaching (or “coachability”) in two different 
ways. Coaching can instruct, enhancing students’ knowledge and abilities, 
or it can improve students test taking orientation, increasing “familiarity, 
confidence and experience with standardized tests and test formats.”52 The 
former isn’t terribly problematic from a validity standpoint. If students 
develop skills that will improve their lawyering abilities as they prepare for the 
tests, the profession benefits. The problem with coaching as instruction stems 
from uneven resource distribution. If it turns out to be true that Kaplan can 
create preparation courses that improve students’ abilities (and thus scores), 
then those who have access to prep courses will have scoring advantages. And 
depending on the magnitude of those advantages, it is possible that coaching 
could diminish the racial equity benefits of the Shultz-Zedeck test. We believe 
it unlikely that a test prep course could significantly alter students’ abilities, 
as they relate to the 26 dimensions in six weeks or so. Moreover, many of the 
S-Z tests used empirically-based scoring, meaning that “right” answers were 
determined not in the abstract but by choosing as “correct” the choices made 
by attorneys who were most highly rated on the factor at issue. But we need 
more information.
Coaching that improves test-taking skills, “characterized by intensive, short-
term, massed drill on items similar to those in the test,” has implications for 
a test’s validity. This kind of coaching’s impact on “cognitive” tests (like the 
LSAT) has been studied extensively, albeit mainly by the two opposing interest 
groups—test administrators, and test preparation companies.53 Predictably, 
51. We imagine that this research would also capture and track non-lawyers: applicants who did 
not go to law school, who left law school early, and lawyers who left the profession.
52. Chaitra M. Hardison & Paul R. Sackett, Use of Writing Samples on Standardized Tests: 
Susceptibility to Rule-Based Coaching and the Resulting Effects on Score Improvement, 21 
Applied Measurement in Educ.. 227, 228 (2008).
53. See, e.g., Robert L. Linn, Admissions Testing: Recommended Uses, Validity, Differential 
Prediction, and Coaching, 3 Applied Measurement in Educ. 297 (1990); Devon W. Carbardo 
& Cheryl I. Harris, The New Racial Preferences, 96 Cal. L. Rev. 1139 (2008); Lani Guinier, 
Reframing the Affirmative Action Debate, 86 Ky. L.J. 505 (1997-1998).
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research sponsored by the LSAC finds negligible impact from coaching while 
test prep sponsors find significant score improvement after good coaching. 
Relatively little research, however, has considered coaching’s effects on other 
kinds of performance tests.54 What we do know about coaching and situational 
judgment tests seems to suggest that some question formulations are less 
susceptible to coaching than others55 and that tests with complex scoring 
systems (asking not only for the best answer to a question but also the worst, 
for example) and heterogeneous content might be less susceptible to coaching 
than tests designed to predict a narrow set of skills.56 That is generally good 
news—questions can be rephrased, if research suggests they should be, and the 
Shultz-Zedeck test involves complex content. But research on the actual test 
must be done before we can declare with any certainty that it is both valid and 
racially equitable in the face of potential coaching. The Shultz-Zedeck study 
provides sufficiently promising results that further research is worth doing.
D. Implications for Admissions
Schools could begin to use the tests now and take part in continuing 
research or they could wait until further research has replicated the first study’s 
results. Either way, our hope is that applicants will be able to take the Shultz-
Zedeck test in conjunction with the LSAT (which would avoid the added 
burden of a second test date). The test probably would take no longer than 
an hour to administer and it would include a mixture of situational judgment, 
biographical data and personality questions. Law schools could use the 
results of the test in several different ways. If, for example, a school wanted to 
maintain a threshold level of predicted academic success among its students, 
it could set an LSAT floor. Applicants whose LSAT met or exceeded that floor 
would be among the pool eligible for further consideration. At that point, the 
LSAT would cease to be relevant and applicants could be judged based on 
scores related to the lawyering effectiveness measures and other less tangible 
factors. Alternately, applicants could be grouped together within LSAT bands 
and the Shultz-Zedeck tests used to decide among students within each band. 
Admissions officers could also combine the new test scores with the LSAT 
and undergraduate grades to create a new composite score, and use that score 
in much the same way as the index score is used now—preferring applicants 
with higher overall composite scores over those with lower scores. Another 
version of that approach would be to admit a set number of students, perhaps 
20 percent of the class, based primarily on traditional index scores and use 
54. See Michael J. Cullen, Paul R. Sackett & Filip Lievens, Threats to the Operational Use of 
Situational Judgment Tests in the College Admission Process, 14 Int’l J. of Selection and 
Assessment 142, 143 (2006). 
55. See Filip Lievens, Tine Buyse, Paul R. Sackett & Brian S. Connelly, The Effects of Coaching 
on Situational Judgment Tests in High-Stakes Selection, 20 Int’l J. of Selection and 
Assessment 272, 276 (2012). 
56. See id. at 280. 
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the new composite number to guide decisions on the rest of the class.57 All of 
these options would reduce the arguably discriminatory nature of law school 
admissions, some more than others. The best approach certainly will not be 
developed quickly but a moral commitment to equality demands that we 
invest the time.58
III. Conclusion
For too long law schools have employed overly narrow admissions practices 
that tend to favor white applicants at the expense of applicants of color. Those 
practices seek out applicants who promise to get better first-year grades, grades 
that reward stylized argumentation and the analytic reasoning necessary 
to excel at it. Growing consensus suggests that lawyers need to know how 
to do so much more than reason and argue. They counsel and advise, they 
collaborate and build relationships, they fact-find and engage in research, they 
problem-solve. And success as a lawyer depends upon the ability to do all of 
this and more with integrity and skill. The Shultz-Zedeck research suggests 
two important and interrelated findings: it is possible to test for the propensity 
to be a good lawyer, robustly defined, and—if we admit students on the basis of 
these tests—law school admissions will become more racially equitable.
The next research and implementation steps cannot happen without a 
commitment from the law school community. To conduct further research we 
need funding and participation at much higher levels. This research offers 
an important starting place for any school that is committed to contributing 
to a diverse and skilled legal profession. But we cannot continue it without a 
57. Whichever option law schools choose, they will not be the first institutions to consider 
situation judgment-like or personality tests for admissions. In medical fields, interpersonal 
situational judgment tests are used in admissions in Belgian medical schools and to certify 
general practitioners in the United Kingdom. See Filip Lievens, Tine Buyse & Paul R. 
Sackett, The Operational Validity of a Video-Based Situational Judgment Test for Medical 
College Admissions: Illustrating the Importance of Matching Predictor and Criterion 
Construct Domains, 90 J .of Applied Psychol. 442 (2005). The Association of American 
Medical Colleges, the body that administers medical schools’ admissions test (the MCAT), 
recently considered adding personality measures to the test. While the association decided 
against it for now, sections were added on the behavioral sciences and critical thinking in a 
cross cultural context. See Pauline W. Chen M.D., A Better Medical Admissions Test, N.Y. 
Times, May 5, 2011, available at www. http://well.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/05/05/a-better-
medical-school-admissions-test/. The Educational Testing Service has created an online 
evaluation called the Personal Potential Index (PPI) that assesses creativity, communication 
skills, teamwork, resilience, planning and organization and ethics and integrity. A variety 
of business and graduate schools accept PPI scores, in addition to traditional cognitive 
measures, for admissions purposes. See Patrick C. Kyllonen, The Research Behind the ETS 
Personal Potential Index (PPI), Educational Testing Service (2008), available at http://www.
ets.org/Media/Products/PPI/10411_PPI_bkgrd_report_RD4.pdf.
58. We believe that, while beyond the scope of this paper, the research also has obvious 
implications for curriculum reform. For the beginnings of discussions of what those 
implications might be, see William D. Henderson, A Blueprint for Change, 40 Pepperdine 
L. Rev. 461 (2013); Kristen Holmquist, Challenging Carnegie, 61 J. Legal Educ. 353 (2012).
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serious commitment of money and time from legal educators and the broader 
community interested in finding a way to ensure a racially inclusive profession.
